(It also means that, like Zarqawi, any new leader will exercise at best limited control of the overall movement.) The Iraqi insurgency, in contrast, is highly decentralized, and the loss of any individual leader will not shut down most of the fighters because they are not waiting for their commanders to tell them where and when to strike. Shiqaqi had led a highly hierarchical organization, and his successors squabbled for years over leadership and next steps. When Israel killed the leader of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fathi Shiqaqi, in 1995, it paralyzed the organization. Nor does the structure of the Iraqi insurgency suggest that the killing will have a lasting impact. And unlike Zarqawi, who also actively plotted attacks outside Iraq, a new leader may focus the struggle on targets within the country. He might be an Iraqi, making him better able to bring together the strands of jihadism and nationalism. Such a leader could eschew the sectarian vitriol Zarqawi regularly spouted. As a result, today the Sunni insurgents often do not work together and at times even fight among themselves.Ī new jihadist leader might succeed in uniting the insurgency more effectively. Not surprisingly, he was never able to unify the Sunnis of Iraq, let alone other Iraqis. Despite recommendations from Zawahiri that he ensure that the insurgency have an Iraqi face, Zarqawi regularly issued statements that implicitly glorified his own role at the expense of local fighters. His criticism of religious scholars who were insufficiently supportive, violence against Iraqis who violated his call to boycott elections, and general unwillingness to accept what he saw as deviance alienated many potential allies, including those among Iraq’s Sunnis who shared his other goals of ensuring Sunni dominance and expelling the United States from Iraq. Even by the standards of al-Qaida, Zarqawi’s interpretation of Islam was intolerant. The beheadings and other barbarous acts he conducted outraged many Sunni Arabs. Zarqawi was a vicious thug who lacked the religious credentials of Hamas’ Sheik Ahmad Yassin, or the panache of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s Leila Khaled.
Many Iraqis, including many hostile to the United States, did not see Zarqawi as their leader. Although Musawi was a determined and capable leader, his successor, Hassan Nasrallah, has proved to be one of the most effective terrorist and guerrilla leaders in history. In 1992, Israel killed Abbas al-Musawi, the secretary-general of the Lebanese Hezbollah, to much self-congratulation. Still, the history of killing terrorist and insurgent leaders suggests that we must be cautious before declaring the death of any leader to be decisive.
His removal will not usher in an era of sectarian harmony, but his survival made that prospect far more difficult. Most important, Zarqawi was a major force behind the growing civil war in Iraq. It also tells Americans that day-to-day victories still occur in Iraq despite the many setbacks that dominate the headlines. insurgency-which other insurgent leader can most Americans name?-and his killing sends a message to the insurgents and to al-Qaida that the United States remains a potent enemy. His screeds against Shiites drew reprimands even from fellow militants such as Osama Bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri. In addition to these terrorist atrocities, Zarqawi was also al-Qaida’s point man in Iraq, a leader in the campaign to disrupt democratic elections, and one of the fiercest proponents of sectarian war. headquarters in Baghdad and orchestrating the bombing of three hotels in Jordan, including one in which a wedding was being held. The guerrilla and terrorist leader was responsible for some of the most horrific acts of a brutal war, such as personally beheading American hostage Nicholas Berg masterminding the strike on the U.N. intelligence, and the Bush administration deserve a hearty cheer for the airstrike that killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.